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THE PRIVATE AUTOPSY: PROBLEMS OF CONSENT
FOREWORD
In the hospital practice of pathology, the problem of proper
authority to perform a private autopsy on the body of a deceased
patient arises regularly. While numerous articles' have investigated
the authority of the coroner, the medical examiner and, in some
jurisdictions, the district attorney, to authorize an autopsy, little
has been said concerning the post-mortem examination which has
no initial medical-legal implications.
Every state, through the exercise of its police power, has. some
mechanism by which the body of a person who dies under "sus-
picious" circumstances can be examined.2 But the great majority
of autopsies are not of this type; many more are performed for
purely medical reasons and must be authorized by some person
who possesses sufficient interest in the body to do so. To facilitate
the obtaining of this required permission, hospitals generally have
a form designed to satisfy the legal requirements.3 When the patient
1 See, e.g., Black, Authority of Coroner to Order Autopsy, At Common Law
and Under South Carolina Statutes, 5 S.C.L.Q. 543 (1953); Letter from
Attorney General Anderson of Kansas to Kansas Law Review, July 16,
1958, in 7 KAN. L. REV. 232 (1958); Comment, 46 J. CRIM L.C. & P.S. 232
(1955); Comment, 1951 Wis. L. REv. 529 (1951); Comment, 25 So. CAL. L.
REv. 68 (1951); 11 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 279 (1962).
2 See, e.g., N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW §4210; OHIO REV. CODE § 313.13 (1958);
WIS. STAT ANN. § 966.121.
3 The form provided by Denver General Hospital is typical:
AUTOPSY AUTHORIZATION
This form is to be filled out in duplicate.
The original must be attached to patient's chart.
The copy is to be retained by the Coroner's Office.
The authorization must be from the nearest relative that is assuming
custody of the body for purposes of burial, as follows:
1. The nearest relative is the father, mother, husband, wife, child, or legal
guardian (but not necessarily in that order).
2. The brothers and sisters who are making burial arrangements in the
event there is no father, mother, husband, wife, child or legal guardian.
3. If there be none of the above individuals, then the next of kin: nieces,
nephews, aunts, uncles, grandchildren and grandparents, etc.
4. If there is no next of kin living, then a friend who is making burial
arrangements.
In the event authorization for post mortem examination is obtained by
letter or telegram, the patient's name and identifying information are to be
completed by the physician, and the letter or telegram of authorization attached
to this form for permanent filing. Any part of this authorization to which the
next of kin will not agree is to be crossed out prior to obtaining signatures.
If an objection to autopsy is received from any person in the same class
as the one consenting, the autopsy will not be performed.
I, the nearest (relative), (friend), assuming custody of the remains for
purposes of burial, do hereby grant Denver General Hospital permission to
perform a post-mortem examination of the body of
It is understood that this permission is given to promote medical knowledge
in order to help others suffering from similar ailments, to insure the patho-
logical cause of death for certificate purposes, and to confirm the medical
diagnosis.
I authorize the removal and retention of such organs or tissues as are
deemed necessary for pathologic diagnosis. I further authorize the hospital to
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dies in the hospital and there are no circumstances which would
interest the coroner, it is usually the attending physician, intern, or
resident physician upon whom the obligation of obtaining the prop-
er consent devolves. He is in the most favorable position to im-
mediately contact the family of the deceased. But in many instances
his task is not as easy as it would appear. The members of the
family of the deceased are not often situated according to the order
of kinship suggested by the usual statutes of descent and distribu-
tion. They may be scattered across a wide geographical area, or
they may have distributed various terminal duties among them-
selves. Consequently a recently deceased man may have a surviv-
ing spouse, several adult children, adult and competent brothers
and sisters, and even parents in esse. Where the law requires that
the consent to the private autopsy be given by the one who is
charged with the duty of burial, the harried intern may in fact be
asked to become a legal expert on kinship in order to obtain the
proper signature of authorization. Some hospital forms help him in
this quandary by clearly outlining the order in which the survivors
may grant permission; yet this aid is no panacea, for he must seek
out and obtain a particular signature from the several available.
The problems of proper authorization do not end when the in-
tern or resident fills out the permission form and obtains the ap-
propriate signature. He may be greatly disappointed after his ap-
parent success to find that the pathologist refuses to perform the
autopsy. The pathologist tends to be a cautious, at times skeptical,
critic when the permission form purporting to be a proper authori-
zation is presented to him. The form may be signed, for example,
by "Mary Citizen, sister of the deceased." At this point the patholo-
gist, who may have had a previous tempering in the fire of litiga-
tion, should wonder inter alia, if this sister (a) is indeed the sister
of the deceased, (b) if there is not in fact a closer kin who not only
survives but may object to the autopsy and (c) if the parties who
signed the form fully understand the essential nature of the con-
sent they have granted. Some of these points the pathologist learns
provide and forward information relating to the ilness [sic] and death of the
deceased to any and every insurance company which may require same.
I further authorize the Denver General Hospital to take such photographs
as may be necessary and permit the use of such photographs only for publica-
tion in scientific and professional journals in connection with medical research
and teaching.
W itness .............................................. M.D. Signed ........... ................
.-..... .............................................................
A pproved ------------------------------------- A ddress ...............................................
Coroner's Office Relation to Deceased...............................
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HOSPITALS Date
Denver General Hosnital
AUTOPSY AUTHORIZATION Ward
(Reproduced with the permission of Name
Robert B. Skinner, M.D.
Manager of Health & Hospitals, Hosp. No.
Denver, Colorado)
MED. REC. 16 (REV. 6/59) OHH Age/Sex
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to accept per fidem, encouraged by his repeated instruction to the
constantly changing house physician staff. Comfortingly, the house
physician usually performs properly in his role of "informed consent
obtainer." Unfortunately, the law is far from uniform. It may vary
geographically, as well as according to whether the hospital is pub-
lic, private, charitable, non-profit, military, or of some other ad-
ministrative type. As a result, house-physicians may never be quite
certain what the law is on the question of private autopsy consent.
This article is offered in an effort to review some of the under-
lying common law principles involved and then to outline statutory
regulations which have been enacted in several jurisdictions. Some
legislatures seeking to clarify the law have merely clouded it, while
others have greatly simplified the involved procedures for doctor
and family alike. An attempt will be made to emphasize these dis-
tinctions.
CONSENT TO THE PRIVATE AUTOPSY
Under old English law, the protection of the body of a deceased
person was reserved exclusively to ecclesiastical jurisdiction. 4 Com-
mon law courts recognized no property or property rights in the
body. Byles, J., of The Court of Queen's Bench, in 1867, observed
that
"A dead body by law belongs to no one, and is, therefore,
under the protection of the public. If it lies in consecrated
ground, the ecclesiastical law will interpose for its protec-
tion. . .. "-
This doctrine apparently had its origin in dictum of Lord Coke:
"The buriall of the cadaver (that is caro data vermibus) is nullius
in bonis, and belongs to ecclesiasticall cognisance. .". ." It should
be noted that Coke did not assert that no individual can have a
legal interest in a corpse, but only that the matter of sepulture was
the concern of the Church and ecclesiastical courts. The Church
took complete charge of the burial and the custody of the body. The
courts of law had no function in this regard until the repudiation of
the ecclesiastical court.7
40steen v. Southern Ry., 101 S.C. 532, 86 S.E. 30 (1915); Tyler, American
Ecclesiastical Law § 970 (1866) ; Annot., 82 Am. Dec. 509 (1887).
5 Foster v. Dodd 3 Q.B. 67, 75, (1867).
63 Co. Inst. 203 (1797).
7 JACKSON, LAW OF CADAVERS (2d ed. 1950).
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The American courts have not gone so far as to treat dead
bodies as property in the strict sense. But they have turned to the
time honored concepts of "property rights" in seeking grounds upon
which the sensibilities of the surviving spouse or next of kin could
be protected. In the early case of Meagher v. Driscoll 8 the defend-
ant had exhumed and removed the dead body of the child of the
plaintiff. Holding that the body itself was not property, the court
felt constrained to rely upon the technical trespass to the plaintiff's
land to grant relief. Later cases have rejected the technical require-
ment of trespass to land as a prerequisite to relief, and have faced
the real issue in a more straightforward manner, holding:
that the right to the possession of a dead body for the pur-
poses of decent burial belongs to those most intimately and
closely connected with the deceased by domestic ties, and
that this is a right which the law will recognize and pro-
tect.9
Judge Mitchell's statement in Larson v. Chase is significant.
[I] t would be a reproach to the law if a plaintiff's right to
recover for mental anguish resulting from the mutilation
or other disturbance of the remains of his dead should be
made to depend upon whether in committing the act the
defendant also committed a technical trespass upon plain-
tiff's premises, while everybody's common sense would
tell him that the real and substantial wrong was not the
trespass to the land, but the indignity to the dead.'0
This expression of the plaintiff's right to recover for mental an-
guish is dictum, and ahead of its time. Courts take considerable
time in divesting themselves of traditional concepts. Consequently,
the right to a body for the purpose of burial was treated as a pro-
perty right in the bulk of the cases which followed. But the courts
did not seem to feel too comfortable in this application:
That there is no right of property in a dead body, using the
word in its ordinary sense, may well be admitted. Yet the
burial of the dead is a subject which interests the feelings
of mankind to a much greater degree than many matters
of actual property. There is a duty imposed by the univer-
sal feelings of mankind to be discharged by some one to-
wards the dead; a duty, and we may also say a right, to
protect from violation; and a duty on the part of others
to abstain from violation; it may therefore be considered
as a sort of a quasi property, and it would be discreditable
to any system of law not to provide a remedy in such a
case. 1
A later attempt met with a similar feeling of malaise:
It is undoubtedly the law that while a dead body is not con-
s 99 Mass. 281, 282 (1868). It is of irelevant interest to note that in this old
Massachusetts case, among the conditions for use of the grave site were pro-
hibitions against interring "persons dying in drunkeness, duel, or by self
destruction, unbaptized, non-Catholics, or otherwise opposed to the Catholic
Church."
9 Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 309, 50 N.W. 238, 239 (1891).
10 Id. at 312, 50 N.W. at 240.




sidered as property in the technical sense of the word, yet
the law recognizes a right somewhat akin to property, aris-
ing out of the duty of the nearest relatives to bury their
dead, which authorizes and requires them to take posses-
sion of the dead body for the purpose of burial. The right
is a personal and exclusive right to the custody and pos-
session of the remains, and, in the absence of a testamen-
tary disposition, belongs to the surviving husband or wife,
if any, or, if there be none, then to the next of kin.12
Dean Prosser is less willing to accept the concept of "property
rights":
[T] he courts have talked of a somewhat dubious "property
right" to the body, usually in the next of kin, which did
not exist while the decedent was living, cannot be con-
veyed, can be used only for the one purpose of burial, and
not only has no pecuniary value but is a source of liability
for funeral expenses. It seems reasonably obvious that such"property" is something evolved out of thin air to meet the
occasion, and that it is in reality the personal feelings of the
survivors which are being protected, under a fiction likely
to deceive no one but a lawyer. 3
Recent cases have recognized with Prosser that the real injury
is to the sensibilities of the survivor, not to any rights of property.
In Darcy v. Presbyterian Hospital,14 the plaintiff mother sued for
damages occasioned by her wounded feelings resulting from an un-
permitted autopsy on her twenty year old son. The trial court held
that the complaint did not state a cause of action, but the Court
of Appeals reversed:
[T]he plaintiff, being the mother and nearest surviving
next of kin to the decedent, is entitled to maintain the ac-
tion and to recover damages for her wounded feelings and
mental distress.' 5
The wounded feelings of the survivor was reaffirmed as a ground
for complaint in McPosey v. Sisters of the Sorrowful Mother.1 6 The
court said:
The wrongful dissection of a dead body is regarded as a
willful and intentional wrong against the person entitled to
the possession and control of the body for burial, and a re-
covery may be had for the mental anguish resulting from
such a mutilation....
We feel that a petition which alleges the right to a
body, a refusal to deliver up said body on demand, and the
performance of an unauthorized and wrongful dissection
thereon while it is withheld, states a cause of action for
damages for the interference with legal rights, and that
mental anguish is a proper element for such damages.17
12 Nichols v. Central Vermont Ry., 94 Vt. 14, 109 At]. 905 (1919). (Emphasis
added.)
13 PROSSER, TORTS 51 (3d ed. 1964).
14 202 N.Y. 259, 95 N.E. 695 (1911).
15 Id. at 260, 95 N.E. at 696.
18 177 Okla. 52, 57 P.2d 617 (1936).
17 Id. at 53, 54, 57 P.2d at 619.
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The Kansas Court, in the following year, recognized this right
in the surviving widow to sue for damages based on mental suffer-
ing even though she suffered no physical injury.18
The cause of action for an unauthorized autopsy is not one that
can be maintained by any member of the surviving family. In
Gostkowski v. Roman Catholic Church,19 the parish priest had had
the body moved from one grave to another without permision from
or notification to the plaintiff-husband. Agreeing that this action
on the part of the'priest was unpermitted, the court went on to con-
sider who was the proper party to sue. The court said:
[W] e conceive the rule to be that the surviving spouse
whose duty it is to bury the deceased has the sole right to
sue, during his or her lifetime, for damages due to interfer-
ence with the dead body. To such a one is intrusted the
duty to guard the dead. True it may be that he may neglect
to exercise such right. Others may then act. Possibly the
surviving members of the deceased's family might join as
plaintiffs (Boyle v. Chandler, 3 w.w.Harr. (Del.) 323, 138
A. 273), but it is inconceivable that each member of the
family could maintain a separate action to recover for
mental pain and anguish.20
Although this case limits the number of actions to one, the dictum
to the effect that other members of the family may maintain the
action in the event of default or the spouse or next of kin appears
to be unusually liberal. Occasionally more than one kin are per-
mitted to join in the action 21 but this is not the general rule. In
Stephenson v. Duke University, 2 the mother and father joined in
an action for damages arising from the mutilation of the body of
their deceased son. The suit was dismissed as to the mother on the
ground that the father alone had the duty of burial and that there-
fore he was the only party who could sue for interference with
that right.
18 Alderman v. Ford, 146 Kan. 698, 72 P.2d 981 (1937).
19262 N.Y. 320, 186 N.E. 798 (1933).
20 Id at 325, 186 N.E. at 800.
21 Boyle v. Chandler, 3 W.W. Harr. (Del.) 323, 138 A. 273 (1927). The sur-
viving husband and children of deceased were allowed to join as party
plaintiffs in an action to recover damages from the undertaker for improper
and indecent burial.
22 202 N.C. 624, 163 S.E. 698 (1932).
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Similarly in Steagall v. Doctors Hospital,23 it was held that the
right to the possession of the dead body belonged solely to the sur-
viving spouse living with the decedent "in the normal relation of
marriage," and if no spouse be living, "then to the next of kin in
the order of their relation to the decedent . . . ." The court dis-
missed the appeal of the sons of the decedent who had attempted
to join with their mother as parties plaintiff. If the court can be
believed, it might seem that in the District of Columbia, the intern
or resident seeking a permission signature from the surviving wife
would have to indelicately inquire as to the "normalcy" of her re-
lationship with the decedent. In the brief opinion, Judge Prettyman
did not elaborate on his use of the term "living in the normal rela-
tion of marriage."
Although a Canddian case24 may be understood as giving the
right of possession to the decedent's body to the executor, the
weight of authority in the United States seems to hold that the
executor or administrator has no such rights to the disposition of
the dead body.25 The court in Simpkins v. Lumbermen's Mutual
Casualty Co.26 stated that the administrator of an estate had no
property right in the cadaver of his intestate and could not there-
fore maintain an action to recover damages for mutilation of the
body.
Under some circumstances the decedent can consent to his own
autopsy. Many states now have statutes allowing a person during
his lifetime to provide for the disposition of his body upon his
death.2 7 Situations have also arisen in which the decedent, while
living, has by contract granted the right to conduct or request a
post-mortem examination. In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lindsay
28
an insurance contract signed by the decedent contained a clause
authorizing a post-mortem examination at the election of the in-
suror. The insuror took the additional precaution of obtaining per-
mission from the surviving wife, but was nevertheless sued by the
daughter of the decedent. The court said:
It seems to be recognized in Illinois . . . as well as in other
states . .. that one may make testamentary disposition of
his own body .... If he may do this by will, we see no law-
ful objection to his doing it by contract.
29
On the other hand, in American Employer's Liab. Ins. Co. v. Barr,30
the court seems to indicate that the beneficiary of the policy rather
23 171 F.2d 352 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
24 Hunter v. Hunter, 65 Ont. L.R. 586, [1930] 4 D.L.R. 255.
25 25 C.J.S., Dead Bodies, § 3 (1941). See, e.g., O'Donnell v. Slack, 55 Pac. 906,
123 Cal. 285 (1899), in which the court held that as against the wife of
the decedent, neither the probate court nor the personal (non-related) rep-
resentative of a decedent has a superior right to his body. There were no
directions in the decedent's will but his widow alleged that the decedent's
"last request" had been to be buried in Ireland; she applied for a court
order to obtain money from the decedent's estate to carry out this last wish
personally.
26200 S.C. 228, 20 S.E.2d 733 (1942).
27 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 91-3-9 (Supp. 1961).
28 69 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1934).
29 Id. at 629.
30 68 Fed. 873 (8th Cir. 1895).
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than the widow was the person entitled to give permission for an
autopsy under the provisions of the policy.
A further complication was introduced in New York for those
attempting to obtain permission to perform an autopsy. In Beller v.
City of New York 3' the court said,
In the absence of a testamentary disposition, the right to
'the possessioh of the body of one who has died belongs to
the surviving husband or wife or next of kin for the pur-
pose of preservation and burial. Any one infringing upon
such right by mutilating the remains without consent of
the person or persons entitled to the possession thereof may
be required to pay damages for the injury to the feelings
and for mental suffering resulting from such unlawful act,
even though no pecuniary damage is alleged or proved.
In its use of "person or persons entitled to the possession" it
would seem that the court, absent the present New York statute;
would have required the permission of more than one person where
more than one were entitled to possession.
In Deeg v. City of Detroit,2 the husband of the plaintiff was
killed by a city bus. At the direction of a doctor at the city hospital
where the victim died, an autopsy was performed to determine
whether the decedent had been drinking. The wife sued on the
grounds that she had not granted permission for the autopsy. While
the action was pending, the plaintiff-wife also died. The adminis-
trator continued the suit and was awarded judgment over defend-
ants' motion for a directed verdict. On appeal, the case was reversed
with direction to dismiss. The appellate court said that while the
surviving spouse has an action for an unpermitted autopsy on her
husband's body, the right of action did not survive the death of the
plaintiff-wife.
Further problems arise when the law recognizes the right to
grant permission in the next of kin but fails to indicate a preferred
order among the survivors of that class. A dispute for and against
the autopsy of a widowed parent, when waged between several
adult brothers and sisters, leaves the attending physician and the
pathologist in a quandary. Unfortunately the safer course is usually
elected, the autopsy not performed, and valuable medical knowl-
edge lost.
VARIATION IN STATE STATUTES
Recognizing this difficulty, several states have enacted statutes
in an attempt to simplify the procedure by indicating clearly who
is authorized to sign the consent form. Legislatures have proceeded
cautiously in this area, lest the hospital pathologist be given too
much liberty. However, the pathologist's role in the autopsy is not
to inflict needless willful and wanton injury upon the feeling of
the survivors or to mutilate the deceased body. Rather he is charged
with the vital responsibility of determining the cause of death and
the extent of the disease process for the protection of the com-
munity and for the advancement of medical knowledge. Those
31 269 App. Div. 643, 58 N.Y.S.2d 113 (1945).
32 345 Mich. 371, 76 N.W.2d 16 (1956).
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statutes which facilitate this important post-mortem investigation
are to be lauded.
A statute prescribing the necessary authorization for private
autopsies should give those concerned with performing the autopsy
a safeguard against suit by members of the family of the decedent,
but should also protect the family's sensibilities. The statute should
be easily read and understood by the nonlegal persons who will be
required to follow it.
An example of a needlessly involved statute is provided by the
Mississippi Code. 38 The power to authorize an autopsy is recognized
as existing in the decedent before death, or in any one of those per-
sons who assume custody for the purposes of burial. However, cer-
tain restrictions are included. When the deceased party was a min-
or, the consent of either parent is deemed sufficient unless the
other parent submits written objection prior to the commencement
of the autopsy. One can envision the pathologist beginning his
autopsy immediately upon receipt of one parent's permission, in
order to foreclose the objecting parent's power to revoke. The Mis-
sissippi legislature further provided that no autopsy shall be held
under this section over the objection of a surviving spouse, or ab-
sent the spouse, a parent; or absent both spouse and parent, a sur-
viving child. It is submitted that such a provision unnecessarily
complicates the autopsy procedure.
The drafters of Oklahoma's statute34 on the subject failed to
consider that if a law specifically mentions a member of a class, it
is interpreted as specifically omitting those members of the same
class not mentioned. Hence the Oklahoma statutes provide that the
right to dissect the dead body of a human being exists whenever
any husband, or next of kin, of the deceased person so authorizes.
It might be assumed that such a small point as failure to mention
the wife of the decedent would never cause difficulty. However, in
the case of In Re Kyle's Autopsy,'5 precisely this point was in issue.
The surviving widow granted permission for an autopsy to be per-
formed on her deceased husband. The surviving sisters of the dead
man sued for damages alleging that the statute did not provide for
the widow and that they were "the next of kin." The court held
that such a strict construction of the statute would'be contrary to
any reasonable intention of the legislature. While this result was
33 Miss. CODE § 7158-08 (Cum. Supp. 1962).
34 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1154 (1951).
35 309 P.2d 1070 (Okla. 1957).
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probably equitable and desirable, quaere whether the decision con-
formed to proper principles of jurisprudence, and whether the
judge should have left it to the legislature to correct an improper
statute.
The statutes of Nevada36 and North Dakota, 37 in provisions
similar to the Oklahoma one, specificallly include the wife with the
husband and next of kin.
Wyoming38 provided that the autopsy could be authorized by
the "nearest living kin of deceased." This constitutes an unfortun-
ate narrowing of the common law. Requiring a search for the near-
est relative rather than either a nearby kin or a non-relative who
has assumed the burial duties places an undue burden on the doc-
tor seeking the permission.
Several states have recognized the right of a person, before
he dies, to authorize a private autopsy. Unless the statute provides
for recognition of a defective testamentary instrument for the pur-
pose, it probably adds little. It seems clear that all jurisdictions
would uphold a valid testament in which the testator gives direc-
tions for his own autopsy, and to which there were no objections
by survivors.
Some states approve non-testamentary instruments executed
by its deceased to authorize an autopsy. The Montana statute is
an example:
The right to perform an autopsy upon, or to dissect the
dead body of a human being, or make any post-mortem
examination involving dissection of any part of such body,
shall be limited to the following cases, viz: . . . (c) cases
where dissection, autopsy or post-mortem examination is
directed or authorized by the last will and testament, or
codicil thereto or other written statement of the deceased,
whether such statement be of testamentary character or
otherwise .... 39
This apparently includes the standard hospital autopsy form when
signed by the decedent prior to death, even though it usually will
not meet the requirements of a will.
Kentucky 40 provides, inter alia, that the autopsy will be au-
thorized, ". . . whenever written consent thereto, duly signed and
acknowledged prior to his death, has been granted by the de-
ceased."
In New Jersey41 the medical director of an institution may,
with the approval of the board of managers of that institution,
authorize an autopsy on an indigent patient to determine the cause
of death or the cause of mental ailment. The statute makes no men-
tion of the decedent's family whose objections presumably could
be disregarded.
New Mexico 42 allows the state department of public health to
authorize the dissection of a decedent's body in the absence of
36 NEV. REV. STAT. § 451.010 (1957).
37 N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06-13 (1959).
38 Wyo. STAT. § 6-100 (1957).
39 MONT. REV. CODE § 69-2308 (1947).
40 Ky. REV. STAT. ch. 72.070(2) (1960).
41 N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 30: 4-104 (1964).
42 N.M. STAT. § 12-7-7 (1953).
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surviving relatives. The statute allows the anatomical or pathologic-
al department of a properly incorporated hospital, school or college
to perform the autopsy. Connecticut 43 also provides that where
there has been a fruitless but diligent search for surviving relatives
or, in their absence, a friend assuming the burial duties, an autopsy
may nonetheless be performed without liability provided that not
less than 12 hours nor more than 48 hours has elapsed from time of
death. Measures like the New Mexico and Connecticut ones, which
provide the medical staff with a legitimate method of securing an
autopsy where the relatives and friends are not found after reason-
able search are commendable. The autopsy to have maximum value
as an educational aide or protection for the community should be
performed without undue delay.
The Montana Code provides that where the decedent died in a
state-operated institution, and left no relatives charged with the
duty of burial, the superintendent of that institution may apply for
an order from the district court to authorize the autopsy.44 This
method may be too cumbersome to be practical.
The Tennessee Code,45 The Michigan Statutes,46 The Wisconsin
Statutes47 and the Colorado Revised Statutes48 all provide a simple
and apparently workable method for obtaining proper permission
to perform an autopsy while safeguarding the rights of those par-
ties interested. With minor variations, each of these brief, clearly
worded statutes provides that the father, mother, husband, wife,
guardian, next of kin, or in the absence of the foregoing, a friend or
agency which is assuming the responsibility for burial, may author-
ize an autopsy. They further provide that if two or more of the
above persons assume custody of the body, consent of one of them
is sufficient. These statutes provide a reasonable and workable
method of coping with the autopsy permission problems in our
modern hospitals.
Some states have failed to provide any statutory mechanism
by which the citizens of those states may authorize an autopsy. In
these states the common law prevails. With the increased ease of
travel from one state to another persons with few or little remem-
bered relatives, or none, often die in distant hospitals. Where the
staff doctors, interns, residents and students have contributed time,
energy and talent to provide medical treatment for these unfortun-
ate souls, the state legislature should make it easier, rather than
more difficult, to obtain a proper authorization for post-mortem
examinations. The future of medicine itself depends on the dissem-
ination of knowledge and the opportunity to learn. A state which
hampers these ends through a particularly difficult autopsy per-
mission statute should re-examine it to see if it can better protect
the interests of its citizens. It is submitted that the rights of the
people are ultimately better protected by the liberal autopsy statute
than those which stifle medical research by a virtual prohibition of
post-mortem investigation.
4 3 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-143 (1958). JOHN R. FEEGEL, M.D.
44 MONT. REv. CODE § 69-2308 (1947).
45 TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-513 (Supp. 1964).
46 MICE STAT. ANN. § 14.524 (1956).47 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 155:05 (1957).
48 COLO. REV. STAT. § 91-1-33 (Supp. 1960).
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